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REGULATING THE MULTISTATE
PRACTICE OF LAW
Samuel J. Brakel* and Wallace D. Loh**
The licensing and admission power over lawyers vested in each of
the fifty state jurisdictions, ninety-three federal districts and eleven
circuits, has led to a hodgepodge of standards for admission, and regu-
lations that are desperately in need of careful re-examination.
-- Chief Justice Warren Burger'
I. INTRODUCTION
Multistate or interstate practice by attorneys in this country is an
expanding phenomenon. While no published quantitative data specifi-
cally support that assertion, a variety of established or verifiable facts
exist that make the inference virtually indisputable. First is the in-
creased mobility of our society generally2 and with it, no doubt, the
increased mobility of lawyers and their clients--i.e., the mobility of
legal problem-solvers, problem-bringers and hence the legal problems
themselves. Second, an outgrowth of the first set of facts is the increas-
ing degree of uniformity of our laws, to a point where we are now com-
monly confronted with model codes, uniform state acts, federal practice
rules (often copied by states) and similar substantive and procedural
developments. Third, partly a response to the first two sets of facts and
partly a reflection of the growing general complexity of our society, is
the gradual change in the character of law practice from a generalist
skill to an increasingly specialized one; hence the emergence of law-
yers regarded and operating as corporate law specialists, general or
specific federal law specialists, civil rights specialists and others specially
* Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation; B.A., 1965, Davidson College;
J.D., 1968, University of Chicago.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1965, Grinnell
College; M.A., 1968, Cornell University; Ph.D., 1971, University of Michigan; J.D.,
1974, Yale University.
1. Quoted in Wilkey, Proposal for a "United States Bar," 58 A.B.A.J. 355, 356
(1972).
2. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MOBILITY OF POPULATION OF THE UNITED
STATES MARCH 1969-MARCH 1970 (1971).
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equipped to cope with problems that transcend jurisdictional bound-
aries and the legal competence of local generalists.
The first-mentioned fact-the increased mobility of lawyers-sug-
gests a concomitant increase in interstate practice of law, assuming no
absolute restrictions on such practice. The other facts-the mobility
of clients, the multistate character of legal problems and the increase
in uniformity and specialization-suggest a need for, and explain why
lawyers might want to engage in, interstate practice.
Resistance to the phenomenon of increased interstate practice of
law is prevalent today. A network of legal rules and regulations is
aimed at restricting the practice of out-of-state ("foreign") lawyers.
The purpose of this article is to examine critically some of these re-
strictions and their underlying rationales. 3 The "right" or "privilege"
-some limitations turn on this distinction 4-to practice law out-of-
state is regulated by various restrictions tantamount to a general pro-
hibition with the limited exceptions of admission pro hac vice (for one
occasion) and admission on motion (or by comity) as a foreign at-
3. Some earlier examinations of multistate practice regulations include Note, Cer-
tification of Out-of-State Attorneys before the Federal District Courts: A Plea for
National Standards, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 204 (1967); Note, Attorneys: Interstate
and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1711 (1967); Note, Restrictions on Admission
to the Bar: A Byproduct of Federalism, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 710 (1950); Comment, Ad-
mission to the Pennsylvania Bar: The Need for Sweeping Change, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
945 (1970) Comment, Interstate and International Practice of Law, 31 S. CAL. L.
REV. 416 (1958); Note. Unauthorized Practice Statutes and Rights of Out-of-State At-
torneys, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 569 (1967); Note, Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The
Evolution of a Federal Right, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 73 1 (1967); Horack, "Trade Barriers"
to Bar Admissions, 28 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 102 (1944); Nahstoll, Freedom to Practice
Law in Another State, 55 A.B.A.J. 57 (1969); Joost, Consolidation of Law Offices, 53
A.B.A.J. 429 (1967); Dalton & Williamson, State Barriers Against Migrant Lawyers,
25 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 144 (1957); C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911).
4. See Comment, "Yankee Go Home"--Civil Rights Volunteer Attorneys and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 122 (1967), citing MIss. CODE
ANN. § 8666 (1956) which provided in part: "It is hereby declared to be the public
policy of the State of Mississippi that the practice of law before any court or adminis-
trative agency is a matter of privilege and not a matter of right."
Conclusionary distinctions of this type have been challenged in a variety of contexts.
One can no longer treat welfare recipients arbitrarily on grounds that the benefits are
charity. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In that sense, the land-
mark article by Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), arguing that the
poor are entitled to welfare benefits as a matter of (property) "right," is, in its empha-
sis on the right-privilege dichotomy, perhaps conceptually a step backwards despite
the laudatory commitment to better social practices it expresses. Another institutional
area where similar developments have occurred is at the borderline of criminal justice:
One can no longer deny juveniles or mentally ill persons procedural due process by
respectively labeling the proceedings juvenile (see In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967)) or
civil (see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966)), rather than adult-criminal. See also note 86 infra.
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torney.5 All activity beyond the exceptions is, or at least risks being,
prohibited.6 Criteria considered in allowing exceptions include reci-
procity, type of practice and length of practice in a foreign state; resi-
dence in the admitting state; association with local counsel; and home
state examination on competence and ethics. Permitted legal activity
may include litigation in state and federal courts, administrative
agency practice and office practice. Regulations take the form of stat-
utes, bar association rules, case law and court rules.
The restrictive out-of-state practice rules require re-evaluation at
these diverse levels. It is also necessary to examine the reasons under-
lying the rules since the latter are far from self-explanatory in concep-
tion and operation. The two principal rationales are protection of the
public and economic protection of the local bar. Supportive of both is
the basic political fact of federalism, under which states are the enti-
ties designated to regulate certain affairs and concerns of their resi-
dents.
Protection of the public from incompetence or unethical conduct
on the part of foreign attorneys is a purpose legitimate enough on its
face; however, problems arise concerning the degree to which specific
rules relate to the general purpose, the dubious nature of assumptions
or predictions about interstate law practice, formulation of rules
which tend to be too broad or too vague, and the desirability of their
application to specific situations or circumstances. At times it also
appears that the first rationale is used to justify restrictive practice
5. A typical restriction, WIs. STAT. ANN. ch. 256, app. [ST. BAR R. 2(4)) (Supp.
1974), provides:
No individual other than an enrolled active member of the State Bar shall practice
law in this state or in any manner hold himself out as authorized or qualified to
practice law. A judge in this state may allow a nonresident counsel to appear in
his court and participate in a particular action or proceeding in association with
an active member of the State Bar of Wisconsin who appears and participates in
such action or proceeding. Permission to such nonresident lawyer can be with-
drawn by the judge granting it if such a lawyer by his conduct manifests incom-
tency to represent a client in a Wisconsin court or his unwillingness to abide by
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Decorum of the court.
6. What is included in the term "practice of law" depends very much on the con-
text in which the term is defined. Only a few states have statutes defining practice of
law generally. The statutes of some states enumerate certain activities as practice of
law, but the status of activities excluded from enumeration is unclear. Provisions in
other states appear quite circular, referring to practice of law as that in which lawyers
are authorized to engage. Moreover, what is practice of law for foreign attorneys is
distinct from the foregoing and even more elusive, depending on factors such as the
frequency and formality of the activity and of the procedures by which authorization
is sought. See Part IV infra.
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rules which are actually motivated by the second rationale. Further-
more, the legitimacy of that second rationale is questionable: Eco-
nomic protectionism is arguably prima facie unconstitutional or ille-
gal, and rules designed to achieve that objective have been held un-
constitutional under some circumstances. 7
This article will present some conclusions on theoretical grounds
about the existing rules and the public protection rationale. There will
be some discussion about the application of these rules to various mul-
tistate practice situations. Finally, the article will suggest directions for
future empirical research in this area.
II. ADMISSION OF FOREIGN ATTORNEYS PRO HAC
VICE
All but a few states have statutory provisions extending to foreign
attorneys the right or privilege to practice for one specific occasion.
Apparently pro hac vice admission in the few states without relevant
statutes occurs customarily and informally on specific court or local
bar rule authority. 8 Admission pro hac vice is evidently a routine
matter in all states:9 the foreign applicant is simply introduced to the
7. E.g., Darby v. State Board of Bar Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1966):
People v. Black, 156 Misc. 516, 282 N.Y.S. 197, 200 (1935). But see Sanders v. Rus-
sell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968), in which the court appears to admit, at least tacitly,
the validity of economic protectionism. The court, in disposing of the state's claim that
certain restrictions on admission pro hac vice were reasonable and necessary, explicitly
conceded that the "State has basically three interests that need to be given considera-
tion." The court identified the second of these as "the financial or economic interests of
the members of the Mississippi bar." Id. at 246.
Economic favoritism of local residents (or economically motivated discrimination
against nonresidents and aliens) has typically been judicially invalidated in contexts
other than law practice. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (percentage lim-
itation on employers' hiring of aliens); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission. 334
U.S. 410 (1948) (prohibition on issuance of commercial fishing licenses to aliens). See
also Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 1012 (1957).
8. E.g., in Alabama and Ohio there is no formal state-wide authority for admis-
sion pro hac vice, but such admission occurs de facto by way of local custom or rule.
See A. KATZ, ADMISSION OF NONRESIDENT ATTORNEYS PRO HAC VICE 9, 22 (Research
Contributions of the American Bar Foundation, No. 5, 1968); VI MARTINDALE-HUB-
BELL LAW DIRECTORY 7, 1831 (1975). The situation in Connecticut is more obscure.
See Taft v. Amsel, 23 Conn. Supp. 225, 180 A.2d 756 (1962).
9. See Farley, Admission of Attorneys from Other Jurisdictions, 19 BAR EXAM.
227 (1950), reprinted in SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, Div. IV, BAR EXAMINA-
TIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 151 (1952). Notable exceptions
have occured; e.g., the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mis-
sissippi attempted to exclude out-of-state civil rights attorneys by restricting admissions
pro hac vice to one appearance within any 12-month period. See Sanders v. Russell,
401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968).
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judge of the appropriate court by a local attorney, in person or by
letter. The statutes on the subjects are typically permissive rather than
mandatory, and the judge has considerable discretion even in states
where the statutory standards are comparatively explicit.
The pro hac vice statutes can be distinguished from one another on
the basis of several requirements or conditions which must exist before
admission can be granted. 10 The statute of any one jurisdiction may
include one or several of these conditions simultaneously, and it ap-
pears that the courts interpreting the statutes sometimes call for addi-
tional requirements not expressly contained in the statutes. 1 Permis-
sion granted by the judge of the court in question appears to be suffi-
cient in slightly fewer than half the jurisdictions.' 2 However, five more
states admit on judge's permission if the home state of the applicant
reciprocates.' 3 Statutes in nearly half the states permit admission pro
hac vice only on the condition that the foreign attorney associate with
local counsel; 14 three additional states require such local association
only if the same is required by the home state of the applicant.' 5 Fi-
nally, a few jurisdictions further require that the local associated
counsel cosign all papers incident to the action.' 6
10. See KATZ, supra note 8; Farley, supra note 9.
11. KATZ, supra note 8, at 8. The author warns that this statutory compilation can
be misleading if relied upon without thorough research of the decisional law in each
state. Id. at I n.1.
12. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-108 (1947); Ex parte McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 293
P. 47 (1930); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1-18 (1963); DEL. Sup. CT. R. 31(4);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30.090 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 7 (1957); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.916
(1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-3-39 (1972); MONT. REy. CODES ANN. § 93-2005
(1947); N.Y. CT. App. R. 520.8(d); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-27 (1974); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 4, § 723 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-27-13 (1970); S.C.R. FOR
ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW 11; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-105 (1955); V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 5, app. V, rule 51 (1966).
13. FLA. App. R. 2.3(b); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 46A (1974); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 481.02(6) (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4.1 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-42. (1974).
14. E.g., ALAS. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2); ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 28(c); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-3602 (1965); IND. R. ADMISSION & DISCIPLINE 3; IOWA CODE ANN. § 610.13
(1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-104, -122 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 802
(1964) and ME. R. Civ. P. 89(b); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.100 (Vernon 1952) and
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 9.01; NEy. Sup. CT. R. 42; N.H. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 13; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1-26 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4.1 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 9.240 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1602 (1962); VA. Sup. CT. R. 1.6;
WASH. Ray. CODE § 2.48.170 (1974) and WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 7; Wyo.
Sup. CT. R. FOR BAR ASS'N 19.
15. LA. RE. STAT. §§ 37:214, 215 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 7-103 (1970);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 17.1, 17.2 (1966) & tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 1 [OKLA. BAR
ASS'N R. art. II, § 5] (Supp. 1974).
16. ALAS. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2); IND. R. ADMISSION & DISCIPLINE 3; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-27-13 (1969).
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Thus, it should be apparent that the conceptual simplicity of admis-
sion pro hac vice is obscured by the considerable interstate diversity in
rules and, presumably, rationales. Aside from this cloud of diversity,
there is a more fundamental difficulty with the concept of admission
pro hac vice.
Admission pro hac vice in one sense clashes with a principal ra-
tionale behind restriction on foreign practice. Admission limited to
one occasion, and granted only because so limited, clearly has little to
do with protecting the public from an incompetent or unethical for-
eign lawyer. It could be argued that the real consideration behind
admission pro hac vice must rather relate to economic protectionism:
"We will allow you to take money out of the hands of the local bar
this once, but not regularly."
It can also be argued with considerable plausibility, however, that
the pro hac vice statutes intend temporarily to subordinate concern
over foreign attorney competence and ethics to the client's conveni-
ence or other interests. One can postulate a variety of circumstances
under which a client would have a compelling need or desire to retain
a foreign attorney and under which abdication of local control would
not seem anomalous in relation to the objective of protecting the
public.1 7 In addition, admission pro hac vice typically applies to the
trial of a case, where direct judicial supervision is at least theoretically
possible. If the statutes as written and as applied focused on the pres-
ence or absence of public protection and judicial supervision, admis-
sion pro hac vice would not be difficult to justify. The operation and
requirements of the statutes, however, often seem to belie any such
focus.
Reciprocity requirements, for example, imply a disregard of legiti-
mate concerns and instead are explicable solely in terms of economic
protectionism. Clearly, requirements based on the fact that the foreign
attorney's home state also permits simple permission or also mandates
association with local counsel have nothing to do with safeguarding
competence, ethics or even client convenience. Instead, they appear to
stand only for the questionable proposition that a foreign attorney
may take some business from the local bar so long as it has the same
privilege in the foreign lawyer's state.
The requirement that the foreign attorney associate with local
17. Consider, for example, the situation of a local party engaging counsel admitted
to practice in a foreign jurisdiction whose law will be controlling in the local action.
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counsel is, on its face, a rational precondition. The most compelling
reason for the requirement is the assumption that local counsel will
assure or enhance competence in representation-competence in
dealing with local laws and procedures and perhaps in handling local
conditions, personalities, customs and prejudices. The ability to deal
with local procedure might include such activities as watching the
court docket or serving papers related to the case on parties con-
cerned. The ability to deal with local conditions, personalities and the
like is a more elusive asset, but no less important. Legal competence is
a broad and many-faceted quality, and requirements of local associa-
tion should therefore not be attacked on narrow grounds or without
full analysis. Nonetheless, the statutory scheme could be improved by
focusing on the type of case for which local association should bere-
quired and on the lawyer selection process; not just any local lqWyer
should be deemed an acceptable associate for any foreign applicant
on any case.18
The power to enforce standards of competence or ethics rather than
just the effort to achieve minimally adequate and ethical representa-
tion is an important facet of the local association requirement. This is
especially true where the concern is ethics. It is doubtful that associa-
tion with local counsel improves the ethics of the foreign lawyer, but it
does enhance the chances of remedial enforcement for the state or the
client. To a lesser extent, the argument also applies to the concern
over competence. In some jurisdictions, the local associated counsel is
made an agent for service of papers in case of foreign attorney mis-
conduct,19 and in other states the associate may actually be answer-
able for misrepresentation. 20 These requirements give the associated
lawyer a real interest in the actions of the foreign lawyer and hence
increase the likelihood that the local counsel will indeed exert control
over the foreign attorney to insure the competent and ethical conduct
of the latter.
Of course there are more direct ways than local association rules
for states to enforce ethical and competency standards with respect to
foreign attorneys. Extension of service of process can be accomplished
18. For example, a local lawyer specializing in municipal bonds would not be
appropriately associated with a foreign lawyer representing a criminal defendant.
19. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 610.13 (1950); KAN, STAT. ANN. § 7-104 (1963);
VA. Sup. Cr. R. 1:6.
20. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 610.13 (1950); In re Greenberg, 15 N.J. 132,
104 A.2d 46 (1954).
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via long-arm statutes. 21 In addition, sanctions against the foreign at-
torney may be enforced through criminal action or through the con-
tempt power of the court before which he or she practiced. A final
sanction can be the loss of fees. 22 However, dependence on court or
aggrieved client initiative may reduce the practical effectiveness of
these alternatives. Action would probably be taken only in extreme
cases. Nonetheless, the local association requirement appears advan-
tageous because it combines the feature of actual aid in the matter of
competence with the greater possibility of enforcement in case of mis-
conduct.
The permissive, as opposed to mandatory, character of the pro hac
vice statutes,23 however, has little to commend it. Whether lawyer
competence or ethics, client interest, or even the suspect economic
protectionism is at stake, there is no justification for treating like situ-
ations differently. Such disparate treatment may in fact violate the
concept of equal protection under the law. If the permissive or discre-
tionary wording of the statutes is intended simply to give the decision-
maker power to weigh subtle factual differences that would be diffi-
cult to deal with by statutory provision, there is no objection. If the
statutes permit arbitrary exercise of discretion, however, they should
be amended. Labeling the interstate practice of law a privilege rather
than a right only begs the question; it hardly constitutes a justification
for arbitrariness. 24
III. PERMANENT ADMISSION
A foreign attorney may obtain more general or permanent admis-
sion under circumstances and by procedures that are similar or iden-
tical to those applicable to local citizens seeking bar admission. Speci-
fically, a foreign attorney may take the local bar examination, establish
21. Long-arm or implied consent statutes, originally providing for jurisdiction
over nonresident motorists, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 345.09 (1971), now extend such
jurisdiction in a broad range of contexts. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411
(1958) (corporate liability); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1974) (civil liability generally); NEv. REV. STAT. § 14.080 (1973) (products liability).
22. See Note, Remedies Available to Combat the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 501 (1962).
23. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 170(b) (1971): "Attorneys may be admitted
pro hac vice in the discretion of the court and such admission will be at the pleasure
of the court."
24. See note 4 supra.
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residence, satisfy the ethical requirements and be admitted as a local
attorney. However, a foreign attorney may sometimes gain permanent
admission on motion under the principle of comity without taking the
local bar examination.2 5 Conceptually, the individual is then admitted
as a foreign attorney, though the vast majority of jurisdictions blur the
conceptual point by adding residence requirements indicating that the
applicant is at least expected to become a local attorney. In some
states, permanent admission of foreign attorneys is accomplished
through a special attorneys' examination, a process distinguishable
both from local admission through a complete examination and from
admission on motion without examination.26 Again, however, require-
ments regarding residence, years of prior practice and moral character
may be a part of the process.27
As with the pro hac vice rules, the scope and rationale of the re-
quirements covering permanent admission of foreign attorneys are
unclear. Some rules and reasons are legitimate in theory; some are
perverted in application; others have little justification either in theory
or as applied.
A. Residence28
In the majority of jurisdictions, residence requirements are part of-
indeed, appear to be the conceptual and practical essence of-the
25. See, e.g., D.C. Cr. R. 46(I)(c)(3), (4); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 0A, § 705
(Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.946 (1962).
26. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 5 [OKLA. ADMuSsIoN TO PRAC-
TICE R. 41 (Supp. 1974); WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 3(B)(10), 4(B).
27. There are some interesting sidelights to the general admission-of-foreign-
attorneys subject worth noting. For example, some American Indian tribes are now
establishing admission requirements, including bar examination on the tribal codes
and constitutions, for practice in the tribal courts. Interview with Judge John Sharp,
Judge Howard Doore and Court Assistant Sandy Watts, Blackfoot Tribal Court,
Blackfoot Reservation, Browning, Montana, Oct. 11-12, 1974. In a totally different
setting, consider the recently adopted New York rules under which lawyers who are
not U.S. citizens may be licensed as "legal consultants." 22 N.Y. CODES, RULES &
REGULATIONS pt. 521 (1974), authorized in N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 53.6 (McKinney
Supp. 1974). Although they greatly restrict the types of activities in which such
"consultants" may engage, the New York rules have been hailed as a "significant
breakthrough." See 60 A.B.A.J. 1080 (1974).
28. Residence is the prime issue in multistate practice today. Virtually all the
unauthorized practice literature of the past several years deals with this issue. See, e.g.,
Note, New Mexico's Bar Residency as an Unconstitutional Penalty on Applicant's
Right to Travel, 2 N.M.L. REv. 252 (1972); Note, Residency Requirement as a Pre-
requisite to Take the State Bar Examination, 1 TEXAS So. L. REv. 231 (1971); Note,
Residency Requirements-Equal Protection for Nonresident Bar Applicants, 48 N.D.L.
707
Washington Law Review
full admission schemes.29 Only a small number of states have no resi-
dence requirements. 30 In short, the entire admission process seems tai-
lored to the lawyer who intends to settle and set up practice in a new
state. The process fails to account for lawyers who have some part-
time business in several states.
Requiring an individual to reside in a particular state for a specified
period of time as a precondition to eligibility for certain rights, privi-
leges or benefits seems unrealistic, even archaic. Recognizing the
greater mobility of Americans today than in earlier times, courts have
held residence requirements invalid in a variety of institutional con-
texts. 31 Nonetheless, residence requirements for lawyers appear to
have a measure of theoretical legitimacy to the extent they help to
assure legal competence in the form of the foreign lawyer's familiarity
with local laws and customs and public familiarity with the applicant's
intentions, reputation and skill. Thus, reasonable residence require-
ments for foreign attorneys are not per se irrelevant to the state's legit-
imate concerns.
Such requirements may include preapplication or pre-examination
residence;32 various preadmission and even postadmission require-
ments provide, for example, that a stated period of time must elapse
before the applicant will be admitted to practice, that the candidate
maintain an office for full-time practice, or that the candidate intend
to or actually "reside" continuously within the state.33
REV. 499 (1972); Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for
Admission to the Bar, 71 MICH. L. REV. 838 (1973); Note, Residence Requirements
for Admission to the Bar, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 762 (1972); Note, Residency Require-
ment: Attorneys, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 639 (1972); Note, Residence Requirements
for Initial Admission to the Bar: A Compromise Proposal for Change, 56 CORNELL
L. REV. 831 (1971).
29. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 610.10 (1950); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-
2001 (1947); WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 3(B)(2).
30. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (1947); ILL. Sue. CT. R. 701(a); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 7-102 (1964).
31. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (public welfare); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting rights); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (health services).
32. See, e.g., Mo. Sup. CT. R. 8.01 (3 months residence prior to application);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 804 (1964) (6 months residence prior to examination);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2-1 (1966) (1 year residence prior to admission). See
generally Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar: A Com-
promise Proposal for Change, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (1971).
33. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 9.230 (1974); S.C.R. FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE
LAW 4, 5. Often the residence rules are ambiguous, reflecting changes in attitude and
law that leave gaps in the logic of the law. For example, Missouri's typical residence-
restriction admission scheme was amended in 1972 to include the provision that "a
non-resident attorney who is a member of the Missouri Bar and maintains an office in
708
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It is difficult to judge the reasonableness of each of these residence
rules34 without considering alternative means by which a foreign at-
torney may gain admission suitable to his or her particular circum-
stances, and alternative methods for a state to check the competence
and ethics of the foreign candidate. It is arguable, for example, that a
state can assess the foreign applicant's professional and personal char-
acter by methods which are at least as efficacious as residence. For
instance, the foreign attorney's standing in his or her home state can
provide evidence more reliable than what can be learned about the
candidate by community and local bar observation over the few weeks
or months required by the residence rules.
Moreover, existing residence laws, even if preferable to other indic-
ators of professional and personal character, can nevertheless be ex-
tremely burdensome in practical application. Economically, meeting
the residence conditions may be prohibitive for the lawyer who wishes
to relocate a practice or the lawyer who does not intend to move but
only wishes to practice occasionally, on an interstate basis. For the
lawyer who intends to change residence, the solution may well be
some form of conditional, dual or temporary licensing which would
permit the lawyer to practice during the transitional period.35 For the
lawyer who contemplates only very sporadic multistate practice, ad-
mission pro hac vice appears to be the appropriate solution. For the
lawyer between these two extremes, the problem is more difficult to
solve. Perhaps relaxing the definition of residence, i.e., requiring only
intent to reside or perhaps only intent to practice a significant portion
Missouri for the practice of law may practice law and do a law business as in the
case of a resident attorney." Mo. SuP. CT. R. 9.02.
34. Although there is no case law on interstate law practice to the effect that
residence restrictions are per se unreasonable as there is in the welfare area, see note
31 supra, several courts have invalidated attorney residence requirements on specific
grounds. See Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970),
in which the court held North Carolina's 12-month pre-examination residence require-
ment unconstitutional because not rationally related to a compelling state interest.
The court rather cavalierly dismissed the learning of local law, government and cus-
tom as promoting "cultural provincialism" rather than legal competence. However, it
also implied that a more "reasonable" (shorter) time period to enable the examining
board to conduct interviews and investigate moral character would be acceptable.
Since the decision, the North Carolina Board of Law Examiners has amended its
rule and now requires 2 months pre-examination residence. See sources cited in note
28 supra for further discussion on this issue.
35. Cf. ORE. REV. STAT. § 9.230 (1974). Provisions of this type represent a
growing phenomenon, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-124, Sup. CT. R. 212(j) (Supp.
1973). See also Morris, State Borders: Unnecessary Barriers to Effective Law Prac-
tice, 53 A.B.AJ. 530 (1967); Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to
the Bar: A Compromise Proposal for Change, 56 CORNELL L. RV. 831 (1971).
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of the time, is an answer. 36 A type of limited licensing, confined to the
business that necessitates the interstate practice, is also a possibility.
Alternatively, temporary association with local counsel, presently lim-
ited to admission pro hac vice, could be an effective and workable
solution in the permanent admission context as a check on the newly
or conditionally lice.sed lawyer.37 These solutions do not abolish resi-
dence or thwart its aims; they merely minimize the possible hardships
resulting from residence requirements.
B. Prior Practice
Requiring a certain period of prior practice in another state, in con-
junction with residence or special bar examination requirements, im-
poses an unnecessary burden on the foreign applicant. Independent of
the other requirements, however, the prior practice rule may provide
evidence, though not a guarantee, of a foreign lawyer's professional
and personal character. At best, however, prior practice is only an
indirect indicator of facts better discovered, for example, by examina-
tion requirements. While practical experience is certainly helpful and
perhaps even indispensable to good "lawyering," it is not sufficiently
precise to identify those lawyers who satisfy state standards of, and
state interests in, such competence. If consideration were given to the
similarity between the laws, procedures and examinations of the appli-
cant's home state and those of the "new" state, then the prior practice
rules would gain credibility. However, current rules generally do not
focus on the existence of such similarity.
In some jurisdictions, the prior practice rules require trial experi-
ence in particular. 38 Such a requirement is reasonable only if admis-
sion is of a specialized nature, with a separate license granted for trial
practice 39-not the situation in any state for local admission. Trial
practice constitutes only a small fraction of legal work; to require
36. See Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REv. 561
(1953).
37. It might be equitable as well as substantively useful to apply this requirement
to recently graduated, as well as to "foreign," lawyers.
38. E.g., in Connecticut, trial experience is an absolute prerequisite for comity
admission. In re Plantamura, 149 Conn. 111, 176 A.2d 61 (1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 872 (1962).
39. See Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice? 42 FORDHAM L. REv.
227 (1973).
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experience in it for general admission, and then only in the case of
foreign attorneys, is indefensible.
Several states not only require a number of years of prior practice,
but require the practice to have been in the state of original admis-
sion.40 This additional restriction is also of questionable validity since,
as noted, under prior practice rules, states do not consider the simi-
larity in laws and procedures between the admitting and foreign
states. It is the foreign attorney's practical experience under laws, pro-
cedures and customs similar to those of the admitting state which is
relevant to competence there, not whether that experience was gained
in the state of original admission or elsewhere. Dubious notions about
stability and mobility, and their relationship to competence and ethics
apparently underlie the restriction. The burden of the restriction falls
most heavily on federal poverty lawyers, military lawyers and others
whose practices prevent settling in any one state for an extended period
of time, much less in the state of initial admission.
C. Bar Examination
About a quarter of the states require that a foreign applicant pass a
bar examination before being permanently admitted, regardless of the
length of practical experience.41 At least two of these give a special
examination, distinct from the local one, to foreign lawyers, presum-
ably as a concession to practical experience.42 In several states,
whether a foreign applicant must pass an examination is left to the
discretion of the body (e.g., the board of examiners, the state supreme
court) considering the admission application.43 The remaining juris-
dictions do not require examination of foreign attorneys with a speci-
fied amount of experience. Requiring a foreign applicant to pass the
standard local bar examination equates the process with regular local
admission and is unnecessarily burdensome. Requiring no examina-
tion, on the other hand, leaves no satisfactory means by which to as-
40. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-25 (1960); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 16-16-12 (1967).
41. See, e.g., ARIz. Sup. CT. R. 28; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, ch. 4, app.
[ARTS. OF INCORPORATION OF THE LA. ST. BAR ASS'N art. XIV, §§ 7, 9] (1974);
NEV. Sup. CT. R. 65.
42. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6062 (West Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE §
2.48.060 (1974).
43. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 202; DEL. SUP. Cr. R. 31; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 306a (1973 & Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-51-10 (1953).
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sure competence. Conditioning admission on a special examination
for foreign applicants is conceptually and practically the most appro-
priate procedure.
The examinations themselves, however, are a focal point of much
controversy. Many questions have been raised regarding the content
of the examinations and the correlation between the applicant's exam-
ination performance and subsequent professional competence. Some
critics doubt that bar examinations in any way serve to identify com-
petent lawyers.44 The charge that many of the state bar examinations
place too much emphasis on memorization of detailed rules and pay
too little attention to legal reasoning ability is certainly valid in many
cases. Existing (and proposed) examinations may also be criticized for
failing to measure the applicant's ability to negotiate, speak publicly,
inspire confidence as a counselor, judge people regardless of their
economic or racial background, or demonstrate whatever other capa-
bilities one might expect a lawyer to possess. Within the narrow
framework of the debate (if not of our present knowledge) about local
or multistate legal practice, the proposition that individual jurisdic-
tions have an interest in testing one's knowledge of local rules and
procedures is not untenable. The best means by which to test that
knowledge in the case of foreign lawyer applicants, may well be
through a less restrictive scheme of residence requirements in conjunc-
tion with special examinations. 45
Discretionary examination of foreign applicants, employed in four
states, 46 is desirable only if the discretion is reasonably circumscribed
and focused; however this is seldom done. A better statute would pro-
vide for admission on motion without examination only if (1) the ap-
plicant had significant prior practice in a foreign state, (2) whose laws,
procedures and customs appeared, after a required inquiry, to be sub-
stantially similar to those of the admitting state. An examination
should be required for permanent admission in all other cases.
44. See, e.g., Bell, Do Bar Examinations Serve a Useful Purpose? 57 A.B.A.J.
1215 (1971); Stanmeyer, The Case for a Better Bar Examination, 58 A.B.A.J. 489
(1972). See also Admission to Bar by Examinations in 1971, 41 BAR EXAM. 126
(1972), which states that the national average of applicants passing the local ex-
aminations was 72% in 1971.
45. Without doubt, distinguishing competent from incompetent applicants by
means of an examination (or any other method, for that matter) is extremely difficult.
Examinations that purport to make such distinctions must be subject to critical,
periodic review. See In re Reid, 76 Nev. 76, 349 P.2d 446 (1960), for a discussion of
the merits of bar examinations versus other indicators of legal competence.
46. See note 43 supra.
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D. Reciprocity, Diversity and Multistate Examinations
Reciprocity alone, without consideration of the values sought to be
protected by the admission rules, is unsound. Some states grant full
admission on motion to foreign attorneys only if the foreign attorney's
state has provisions to the same effect.47 If the reciprocity require-
ments derived from an assessment about the similarity between the
laws, procedures and examinations of reciprocating states, then such
requirements would be supportable. There is, however, little evidence
that such an assessment is undertaken. Consequently, reciprocity
does nothing to strengthen the admission on motion concept which,
in the absence of examination or residence requirements, is already
weak because unrelated to the purpose of assuring a foreign attor-
ney's competent and ethical conduct.
Rules excusing classes of applicants from the bar examination and
much of the general sentiment against bar examinations probably
stem from the belief that abstract learning of local rules and proce-
dures is too difficult or too burdensome, and that only practical
learning (experience) is productive and feasible. However, if the goal
of assuring foreign attorney competence in local law and procedure is
to be pursued seriously, the solution lies not in reciprocity, but in
concepts and practices specifically responsive to the interests of the
public and those of the bar.48
Proposals featuring a "national bar examination" as the exclusive
test for bar admission ignore the issue of local law competence or as-
sume that it is not legitimate. Denying its legitimacy is both unrealistic
and unproductive; the conflict between local needs and interests, and
47. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-201 (1972); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-3-25
(1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2-2 (1971). However, a number of jurisdictions
currently admit on motion without examination irrespective of reciprocity. Letter from
Edward 1. Cutler, Tampa, Fla., past member of the ABA Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law, to Samuel J. Brakel, Jan. 24, 1974.
48. Relaxed residence rules, conditional licensing, and association with local
counsel during the conditional period are recommended in the text accompanying
notes 35-37 supra. In general, flexibility in response to real problems is a desirable
characteristic of admission rules and their administration, so long as the fundamental
regulatory objectives are not ignored or undermined. For example, the recent develop-
ment in Florida, whereby exiled or emigrant Cuban lawyers are permitted to take
the Florida bar examination despite their failure to meet some of the other qualifica-
tions required of other "foreign" applicants, should be applauded. Letter from Edward
I. Cutler, supra note 47. The exceptional treatment satisfied the serious employment
problems of Cuban lawyers and the representation needs of their potential Cuban
clients. Whether it is wise to formalize such exceptional treatment is a separate ques-
tion, which may well be moot by the time it receives formal consideration.
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the demands of an increasingly mobile, complex and specialized so-
ciety, persists. Moreover, although the national examination proposals
do not expressly contradict the concept of local control over practice,
they do so in effect by removing from the states the basis for that con-
trol: the power to prescribe application and admission standards. By
thus failing to account for local law competence and to preserve local
control over practice, the national examination concept falls short of
striking a balance which will ensure attorneys' responsibility and relia-
bility, yet permit their mobility.
A more promising solution appears to be the dual examination con-
cept: a national (or multistate) bar examination designed to test gen-
eral ability, supplemented by a local examination to assure a narrower
legal competence. Such a dual scheme is already operative in 39 states
and the District of Columbia.49 Much of the present debate con-
cerning this scheme seems misdirected at questions of efficiency,
e.g., whether standardized national tests using multiple choice formats
avoid duplicative efforts by the examiners of the various states, and
whether they can be graded more easily and objectively. The scheme,
however, seems advantageous. It is consistent with the concept of
local control that characterizes the state admission rules, but at the
same time recognizes the increasing uniformity and mobility of skills
by reducing the burden on "foreign" applicants of demonstrating their
competence. 50
49. Letter from Joe E. Covington, Director of Testing, National Conference of
Bar Examiners, to Samuel J. Brakel, Sept. 9, 1974.
50. For a sampling of the diverse responses to the Multistate Bar Examination,
see Eckler & Covington, The New Multistate Bar Examination, 57 A.B.A.J. 1117
(1971); Covington, The Multistate Bar Examination-A New Approach, 26 ARK. L.
REV. 153 (1972); Pock, The Case Against the Objective Multistate Bar Examination,
25 J. LEGAL ED. 66 (1973); Griswold, In Praise of Bar Examinations, 62 ILL. B.J. 442
(1974). Earlier literature included Thomas, The Bar Examination: It's Function, 32
BAR EXAM. 69 (1963); 1966-1967 Issues in Legal Education (A Survey), 16 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1967); Panel Discussion---A Uniform Bar Examination-Na-
tional or Regional: Is It Possible or Practical? 39 BAR EXAM. 52 (1970).
Well before the actual construction and use of the Multistate Bar Examination,
some states were already moving individually in the direction of examinations viewed
as national in scope. The California examination, for example, was described more
than 10 years ago as a "truly national bar examination" with "very little emphasis on
local law." Thurman, The Law School Dean Looks at the Bar Examination and Bar
Examiners, 31 BAR EXAM. 102, 103 (1962). Concerning the New Jersey examination
of a decade ago, it was observed that "the bulk of the questions could be used inter-
changeably from state to state and that the answers .. .would not vary significantly
from state to state." Gibbons, Preparation of Bar Examinations, 33 BAR EXAM. 18,
23-24 (1964).
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IV. FOREIGN PRACTICE ON INDIVIDUAL RISK:
UNENFORCED OR UNENFORCEABLE
"RESTRICTIONS"
A fundamental aspect of multistate practice regulation is its format
as a flat prohibition against such practice with only limited excep-
tions-admission under certain circumstances when applicants meet
defined requirements. In addition to such explicit exceptions, however,
there exists a large gray area, a no-man's land of unenforced or unen-
forceable proscriptions on professional activity. Indeed, some of this
activity is not just tacitly permitted, but has been deliberately carved
out by court decisions or by the logical implications that flow from the
decisions. Paradoxically, the range of unenforced proscriptions, i.e., de
facto permitted activity, has become defined and has grown in response
to the effort to restrict foreign lawyer activity.
Needless to say, this area of nonregulation poses some difficult
questions for those who hope to find logic and reason in the rules, and
for lawyers who hope to find instruction as to what they may or may
not do. Contradiction abounds in this no-man's land, and, not surpris-
ingly, the legitimate concerns of assuring ethics and competence are all
but lost in the chaos that has ensued.
Obscuring the boundaries of this no-man's land is the continuing
uncertainty as to what activities are included in the term "practice of
law."51 Few "neutral" definitions are applicable in this context; most
have been framed in response to disputes over the permissibility of
foreign lawyer activity and the collectibility of resulting fees. The ob-
vious result is that the definitions of law practice vary dramati-
cally with variations in perspective or interest. For example, when the
activity in question is performed by a foreign attorney not admitted in
the state, it is in the attorney's interest to designate the activity as iso-
lated or incidental-not truly "practice of law"-and thus not prohib-
ited or at least not enforceably prohibited; however, the complaining
party (the local bar or the aggrieved or nonpaying client) will be moti-
vated to stretch the definition of law practice so that the activity will
fall within it and thus be prohibited. By contrast, when the same type
of activity is performed by a foreign attorney who has gained admis-
sion pro hac vice, the interest in labeling the activity as isolated or in-
51. For detailed discussion of this issue, see Part IV-D infra.
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cidental shifts diametrically. In short, the confusing situation is that
"practice of law" is a positive characterization in one instance and
from one perspective, but an incriminating and undesirable label in
the other. Significantly, none of these designations has much relevance
to the issues of attorney competence or ethical conduct.
Ostensibly, many of the distinctions between illegitimate and legiti-
mate foreign practice turn on whether the practice is litigation (state
or federal), agency practice or office practice. While these divisions
are not without their own problems and ambiguities, they do provide
a focal point for the discussion and analysis of the rules and ration-
ales. They are also useful for raising any constitutional issues that may
be involved.
A. Litigation in State Courts
While seldom the major part of a lawyer's work, litigation is com-
monly conceived to be the essence of it. To the extent that one in-
cludes in the conception of litigation the preparation for and preven-
tion of litigation, that view is fair enough. With this conception as
background, it becomes clear that all bar admission regulations con-
template litigation as the heart of what a lawyer is admitted to do.
Permanent or general admission by definition permits the whole
range of lawyer activity, whether closely, remotely or not at all related
to litigation, in addition, of course, to litigation itself. Admission pro
hac vice, on the other hand, is almost exclusively associated with liti-
gation, and specifically litigation in state courts although case law
provides implicit and occasionally explicit indications that the pro hac
vice procedure has relevance to litigation in federal courts, practice
before nonjudicial forums, and even to foreign office practice. 52 But
the primary function of the process is to gain access to the state
courts, and awareness of this fact affords a refined perspective of ad-
mission pro hac vice, its rationales and specific requirements.
For example, litigation in a state court generally involves the appli-
cation of local law and procedure.53 This in turn suggests that pro hac
vice criteria should be especially concerned with assuring competence
52. See In re Estate of Waring, 47 N.J. 367, 221 A.2d 193 (1966).
53. Some state court cases, however, may turn on federal or foreign law--the
reason the foreign attorney is involved in the first place. But even in such instances,
acquaintance with local custom, procedures and personalities may be important and
constitute justification for association with a local attorney.
Vol. 50: 699, 1975
Multistate Practice
in that law and procedure. Because the imposition of examination and
residence requirements for admission pro hac vice would render that
procedure so cumbersome as to be useless, the requirement of associa-
tion with local counsel becomes especially compelling as the only
method of attempting to assure that competence. However, another
aspect of litigation is that the foreign attorney will be before, and to
an extent within the control of, the state court. This might seem to sa-
tisfy the state's interest in ethics and enforcement and thus obviate pro
hac vice local cocounsel and cosignature requirements. However,
since actual court presence is likely to be only a fraction of "litiga-
tion,"' 54 and since court scrutiny and control may exist more in theory
than in practice even during actual presence, the local association
requirement should probably be retained.
B. Litigation in Federal Courts
In the absence of a unified or uniform federal bar comparable to
state bars, the federal courts play a large role in controlling the prac-
tice of law before them. As a result, each federal court has its own
admission standards, unbound by state rules and limited only by fed-
eral constitutional provisions. The United States Supreme Court and
the federal courts of appeals typically admit attorneys upon a showing
of authorization to practice before the highest court of any state.
55
Similar deference to state admission rules is understandably a primary
feature of the federal district court rules.56 There is no federal bar
examination or federal test of character; reliance is placed on state
regulations. About 15 district courts offer general admission to any
54. See Part IV-D infra.
55. U.S. Sup. CT. R. 5; FED. R. App. P. 46. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SU-
PREME COURT PRACTICE 600-04 (4th ed. 1969).
56. This has occurred although Congress has expressly delegated to these courts
the power to promulgate rules regulating practice before them. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1654
(1970), 2071 (Supp. III, 1973).
Even in the absence of such express delegation, a good deal of literature and some
law exists to the effect that the courts have "inherent" power and responsibility to
regulate the practice of law, including some rather dire assessments and predictions
about the conceptual and practical consequences of the "abandonment" of this power.
See Marks, Military Lawyers, Civilian Courts, and the Organized Bar: A Case Study
of the Unauthorized Practice Dilemma, 56 MILITARY L. Rev. 1 (1972); AMERICAN
BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK (1972) (compilation of state
statutes and cases on practice of law); In re Branch, 70 N.J.L. 537, 57 A. 431 (1904);
KAN. Sup. Cr. R. 41, cited in Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961); Cooper's Case,
22 N.Y. 67 (1860).
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attorney and 45 require membership in the bar of the state where the
district court sits 5
The district courts also grant admission pro hac vice, many re-
quiring association with local counsel as well; others also have reci-
procity and "neighboring state" rules. 58 Some Southern district courts,
apparently desiring to control the influx of foreign civil rights lawyers,
have sought to limit admission pro hac vice to a small number of cases
per attorney per calendar year.5 9
Although they often follow state standards, the federal courts on
occasion assert, or are instructed to assert, their independence in prac-
tice-of-law matters.60 Presumably the federal courts pursue the same
policies which underlie the state practice rules. Consequently, much of
the commentary about forms of admission generally and about their
relevance to state litigation applies to litigation in the federal courts as
well. However, one peculiarity of federal laws and procedures--their
relative uniformity--contrasts with the interstate situation. On the
other hand, the federal courts adopt many aspects of state regulation
which are formulated essentially in response to diversity.
We can assume that state ethical standards are useful for federal
court purposes as well. However, state methods of assuring legal com-
petence may not be so relevant in the federal court context. State bar
examinations, to the extent that they test knowledge of local law and
procedures rather than broader professional capabilities, are not an
adequate index of competence in a court where federal substantive
and procedural law is applied. Thus, federal admission procedures
requiring only membership in a state bar, gained by way of state ex-
amination, are inadequate to assure competence in a federal court.
Because state law is frequently relevant and applied in federal forums,
passage of a state bar examination and state bar membership should
be viewed as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for federal court
practice. Similar analysis suggests that other state admission require-
57. Note, Constitutional Right to Engage an Out-of-State Attorney, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 856, 863 (1967).
58. Id.
59. See Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968), invalidating a district
court rule which limited pro hac vice appearances to one per year: "Any rule, what-
ever its source, that unnecessarily restricts a litigant's choice of counsel in civil rights
litigation cannot be sustained." Id. at 246. See note Ill and accompanying text infra.
60. For example, in Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957), the Court
remanded a federal disbarment decision in which the district court had felt bound to
accept as dispositive an earlier state disbarment. The case was explicitly confined to
disbarment, but the logic is certainly applicable to admission issues as well.
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ments such as association with local counsel, residence and reciprocity
-if designed to strike the previously mentioned balance of interests in
competence, mobility and responsibility6 -are also relevant to quali-
fication for federal admission, but alone should not be sufficient. To
complement the state qualifications, there is a need for a mechanism,
perhaps examination, to assure competence in federal laws and proce-
dures.62
Many proposals have been advanced for uniform federal bar ad-
mission, including special federal certification, general admission of
all attorneys regardless of residence, and development of national
standards. 63 These proposals, however, ignore the state law, proce-
dure and custom component that is relevant in federal courts. Thus,
while the existing scheme is deficient because too restrictive, these
proposals are unsatisfactory because too lax. Standard federal admis-
sion rules seem desirable, but only in conjunction with state require-
ments.
C. Federal Agency Practice
Federal agency practice is a distinct topic primarily because the
United States Congress and the United States Supreme Court have
treated it so. Theoretically, practice before state agencies could have
been subject to separate admission procedures, but a clear develop-
ment along such lines apparently has not occurred. On the other
hand, federal agency practice could readily have been integrated with
the rules and regulations covering federal court practice so that fed-
61. To promote such a balance, for example, most state residence rules should
be relaxed as to requirements of intent and duration; state reciprocity rules should
focus on actual similarity of laws and procedures between the jurisdictions in ques-
tion. See Part III supra.
62. Notably, the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas have established their
own machinery for examinations, but waive the examination for members of the Ar-
kansas bar. The process apparently has not been used in recent years. The Southern
District of Ohio requires passage of its own examination on points of federal law as
well as membership in the bar of any American jurisdiction. Note, Constitutional
Right to Engage an Out-of-State Attorney, 19 STAN. L. REV. 856, 863 n.40 (1967).
By the same token, state examinations should not neglect some coverage of federal
laws and procedures, which are sometimes relevant in state litigation and office
practice.
63. See Comment, Certification of Out-of-State Attorneys Before the Federal
District Courts: A Plea for National Standards, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 204 (1967);
Crotty, Requirements for Admission to Practice in the Federal Courts, 19 BAR EXAM.
243, 255-62 (1950), reprinted in SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, Div. IV, BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 123, 138-47 (1952).
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eral practice in general, like state practice in general, becomes the
operative field. The federal practice did not, however, develop this
way.
In the leading case in this area, Sperry v. Florida,64 the United
States Supreme Court held that a state could not deny the right of a
layman, not licensed to practice law in any state, but specifically li-
censed to practice before the U.S. Patent Office, to perform lawyerlike
services related to the preparation and prosecution of patent applica-
tions. The recognized right of the state to protect its citizens from "un-
authorized" practice is pre-empted in these situations by congres-
sional authority and administrative action implementing that au-
thority.
Since many federal agencies conduct adversary proceedings and
have authority similar to the Patent Office, the Sperry holding could
free a rather wide range of lawyerlike activity from state control. Pre-
sumably, a layperson or "foreign" lawyer, licensed by federal agen-
cies, could maintain offices and perform services in several different
states so long as the individual's activities were confined to agency
affairs. Except to the extent that such a situation might be economi-
cally harmful to a state bar, there appear to be no persuasive argu-
ments against it. Federal agency practice-judging in part from the
very fact that the agencies are empowered and do license laypersons
-seems to be sufficiently "esoteric," distinctive and nonlocal to pre-
clude the need for local bar regulation.
One reason that Sperry might cause concern among guardians of
state and local bar interests is that the case dealt with activities ancil-
lary or incidental to actual appearance before the Patent Office. It is
the permission of such incidental activity-perhaps analogous to non-
litigation activity in the more conventional realm of legal practice-
that greatly broadens the potential range of authorized "unauthor-
ized" practice. In that context, the issue is verbalized under the rubric
"office practice."
D. Office Practice
Despite their inconsistency and ambiguity on some levels, the mul-
tistate practice regulations are still comparatively clear when the ac-
tivity scrutinized is court litigation. The statutes presume litigation as
64. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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the essence of law practice and are framed with that presumption in
mind. Thus, it is clear that admission pro hac vice permits the foreign
lawyer to litigate the one problem for which admission was granted.
Similarly, it is clear that a foreign lawyer who has not been admitted
in a state, pro hac vice or otherwise, violates its regulations by liti-
gating there nonetheless. Difficulties arise, however, when one at-
tempts to define litigation. Without much doubt litigation includes
some activity outside the courtroom in preparation for trial. It can be
argued with equal cogency that it includes some activity designed to
prevent a trial, e.g., out-of-court settlements. However, the logical
implication of stretching the definition of litigation is that all lawyer
activity is in some sense intended to prepare for or prevent a confron-
tation in court.65
Realistically, at some point lawyer activity becomes difficult to de-
tect or restrict. At that point, one might term the activity nonlitigation,
"office practice," or even "not practice of law." The label depends
largely on the context in which the question concerning the activity is
raised. Also at that point, the conceptual problems for rule-makers or
rule-interpreters, whose function is to impart a measure of logic and
predictability to the law, are at a maximum, as are the practical prob-
lems for lawyers who must discern what foreign activity is permissible.
A review of the leading cases relating to office practice indicates the
complexities involved. 66 Without being unduly critical, it appears that
the most conspicuous characteristic of the cases is the courts' substitu-
tion of sophistry for reason. Because the cases also seem to turn pri-
marily on individual fact situations, it is extremely difficult to extract
any consistent or coherent principles from them. Thus, we encounter
terms such as "advice and assistance,1 67 "incidental . ..consulta-
tions" 68 and "solitary incident ' 69 to designate office activity by
65. The intractable detail of the line-drawing process inherent in applying con-
clusory labels such as "litigation" and "office practice" might productively be re-
placed by the more fundamental inquiry, "What activities warrant institution of en-
forcement procedures and why?" See Note, The Practice of Law by Out-of-State
Attorneys, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1276, 1306 (1967).
66. The three leading cases in the area are Appell v. Reiner, 43 NJ. 313, 204 A.2d
146 (1964); In re Estate of Waring, 47 NJ. 367, 221 A.2d 193 (1966); Spivak v.
Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965). See Note, The
Practice of Law by Out-of-State Attorneys, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1276 (1967).
67. Appell v. Reiner, 43 NJ. 313,204 A.2d 146, 148 (1964).
68. In re Estate of Waring, 47 NJ. 367, 221 A.2d 193, 198 (1966).
69. Spivak v. Sachs, 21 App. Div. 2d 348, 250 N.Y.S.2d 666, 668 (1964), rev'd,
16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
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nonadmitted foreign lawyers which the courts consider not proscribed
or not proscribable. At the same time, some of these terms may de-
note prohibited activity for a foreign lawyer who has been admitted
pro hac vice; e.g., such a lawyer's activity which is merely "super-
visory" or "advisory" in the case for which he or she was admitted
would be suspect. Moreover, the same term can assume different
meanings in the effort to reach the intuitively desired result. Thus,
lawyers, admitted pro hac vice would prefer their activities la-
beled "incidental" (meaning "inseparable" rather than "isolated") and
therefore within the authority conferred by the admission procedure.
In some instances, obvious lawyerlike activities of nonadmitted law-
yers will be designated as "not practice of law" so as to justify nonen-
forcement, while in others the same designation will have precisely
opposite consequences for lawyers admitted pro hac vice, i.e., sepa-
rable or distinguishable from the limited practice of law for which
admission was granted.
The difficulty facing the courts is admittedly enormous. In essence
the courts are asked to make prosecutorial decisions- i.e., enforce-
ment versus nonenforcement-cloaked in judicial language. Funda-
mentals are often obscured by individual issues and special interests.
The basic purpose of the rules is to protect the public from a lawyer's
incompetent and unethical conduct. Therefore, the question must be:
Does each rule serve this objective?
A jurisdictional problem has been identified by commentators who
suggest that "federal rules apply only to federal court practice, leaving
state rules to govern . . . all office practice. '70 This could be a spu-
rious issue; implied is that the presence or absence of specific au-
thority and specific rules shapes the boundaries of permitted legal ac-
tivity by foreign lawyers. In reality, however, there exists no abstract
law or grant of jurisdiction concerning office practice at all. Never-
theless, this void has hardly prevented courts, both state and federal,
from dealing with the issue. For example, Sperry7' represents the as-
sertion of federal jurisdiction over federal agency "office practice."
State courts have assumed jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis.7 2
70. Note, The Practice of Law by Out-of-State Attorneys, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1276,
1303 (1967).
71. 373 U.S. 379 (1963). See text accompanying note 64 supra.
72. See, e.g., Spivak v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 168, 211 N.E.2d 329, 331, 263
N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (1965).
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Another issue is raised by the prospect of granting admission
pro hac vice for office practice. The arguments favoring such ad-
missions can be framed in terms of the harshness or narrowness of
multistate regulations and, from the other side, of the lack of supervi-
sion over office practice as contrasted to litigation. Present provisions
for admission pro hac vice, however, are not necessarily limited by
their terms to litigation in the narrow sense.. One might further ask
whether an a priori definition of office practice for purposes of admis-
sion pro hac vice will be any more workable or rational than the un-
certain parameters of the scope of permitted activity presently devel-
oped in the absence of formal office practice admission procedures.
Turning to more substantive issues, New Jersey presently appears
to have developed the most explicit rules on multistate office practice.
In Appell v. Reiner,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court devised the "in-
cidental" rule: when all but an incidental portion of office practice is
within foreign state boundaries, and the local activity conducted by a
foreign attorney is incidental to the basic out-of-state transaction, that
incidental activity does not constitute unauthorized practice of law.
The Appell court suggested that the activity is not unauthorized so
long as: (1) the foreign attorney is licensed in at least one of the states
in which the transaction occurs; (2) use of local counsel is precluded
because "grossly impractical and inefficient"; (3) association with
local counsel would result in fees in excess of reasonable compensa-
tion; and (4) no local court proceeding is involved.74
Two years after Appell, the same New Jersey Supreme Court ar-
rived at a "coordinating-supervisory" standard for permitted office
practice by out-of-state attorneys. In In re Estate of Waring,75 a New
York law firm which had long represented the decedent and her
family was retained by the executors to administer her estate. Local
counsel was retained for local aspects of the estate while the foreign
counsel limited themselves to "general supervision" and federal taxa-
tion questions. The court granted recovery of fees to the New York
firm, holding that such supervisory activity was not prohibited. The
court emphasized the principle of limiting rules to "commonsensible"
application.76 Noting that a compelling interest in the foreign firm's
73. 43NJ.313,204A.2d 146 (1964).
74. 204 A.2d at 148.
75. 47 NJ. 367, 221 A.2d 193 (1966).
76. 221A.2d at 198.
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retention had been shown, the court also stressed the firm's self-regu-
lation in properly restricting its activities by allocating local matters to
New Jersey counsel. 77
The New Jersey cases are not founded on a clear and consistent ra-
tionale, but perhaps can be explained by the commonsense, but ana-
lytically unhelpful, proposition that unnecessary hardship to clients or
lawyers ought to be avoided. It is clear that there is little connection
between either the "incidental" or "supervisory" rule and the funda-
mental rationale behind multistate practice regulation-assuring
lawyer competence and integrity. The Appell court simply adopted a
fact situation and, by labeling and underlining, transformed it into a
rule; there is no principle, other than intuition or expediency, in this
process. Similarly, in Waring, although the foreign firm's previous
involvements and the fact that local counsel was retained provided
sound factual justification for the result reached, the "supervisory"
rule which emerged from the case is less than useful precedent.
That there is little rhyme or reason to the Appell and Waring cases
is exemplified by a New York case decided chronologically between,
but logically opposite, the New Jersey cases. In Spivak v. Sachs,78 the
New York Court of Appeals reversed lower court holdings that a for-
eign lawyer's service was not the practice of law because "advisory
and consultive" and "a solitary incident." The reversal demonstrates
the unpredictability of case law whose focus is on the incidental or
nonincidental nature of the activity in controversy, a focus which may
have some bearing on the issues of bar economics or client conveni-
ence, but which bears no relation to the basic rationale of assuring
competence and ethics. The New York court did little to clarify the
question. It held that the practice was not permitted because: (1) the
client was a New York citizen rather than a citizen of the foreign at-
torney's state (California); (2) the advice given by the foreign attorney
was directed to the client and not to the local counsel who was also on
the case; and (3) the services were not limited to inspecting documents
and attending conferences, but included advice that the suit be filed in
a different jurisdiction and that local counsel be dismissed.79 The
court then impliedly admitted the transitory significance of those cri-
teria by citing Appell approvingly and adding that in view of "the
77. Id. at 198-99.
78. 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
79. Id. at 165-66, 167, 211 N.E.2d at 330, 331, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 954-55, 956.
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numerous multi-State transactions and relationships of modem times,
we cannot penalize every instance in which an attorney from another
State comes into our State for conferences or negotiations relating to a
New York client and a transaction somehow tied to New York,"8 0
even though the applicable New York statute "could . . . be
stretched to outlaw customary and innocuous practices."18 Spivak,
then, by way of dictum, added two phrases to the store of magic terms
denoting permitted activity: "customary and innocuous practice" and
activity only "somehow tied" to the local forum. It is apparent that
Appell, Spivak and Waring leave the area in considerable disarray.
The federal courts addressing the subject raise constitutional issues,
but essentially are no more helpful because they duplicate the state
courts' failure to focus on the fundamental question of why there is or
should be multistate practice regulation at all, not just why a specific
instance of interstate activity should or should not be permitted. In a
leading federal case, Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.,8 2 a California
attorney, unlicensed in New York, was retained for six years "pri-
marily as a consultant" to the defendant's New York lawyer. The de-
fendant was a New York corporation and the consultation was exclu-
sively on federal antitrust matters relating to the movie industry, in
which area the foreign lawyer was a well-known specialist. In an ac-
tion to recover fees, the trial court designated the foreign attorney's
practice a "solitary incident" involving only one client in one matter
and thus not practice of law. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed on the ground that even though the attorney's activi-
ties related to a single case, the duration of those activities dictated
that they be considered practice of law. However, on reconsideration
en banc, the court reversed itself on pragmatic and constitutional
grounds. It noted the "increased specialization and high mobility of
the bar" and held that "[u] nder the privileges and immunities clause
of the Constitution, no state can prohibit a citizen with a federal claim
or defense from engaging an out-of-state lawyer to collaborate with an
in-state lawyer and give legal advice concerning it within the state. 83
The final result of Spanos may not be offensive because there was
local association and because consultation was apparently limited to
80. Id. at 168, 211 N.E.2d at 331, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
81. Id.
82. 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
83. Id. at 170.
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federal issues and only one client. The reasoning, as it can be traced
from the lower court's holding to the ultimate decision, however, is far
less commendable. If protection of the public is the rationale for regu-
lation, then the rules should require attorneys such as Spanos to apply
formally for some kind of local bar admission incident to a six-year
consultation period. Labeling an activity a solitary incident and thus
not practice of law, or a solitary incident and nonetheless practice of
law, leads nowhere. Mention of the privileges and immunities clause
focuses no closer to the issue of protecting the public from incompe-
tent or unethical lawyer behavior. 84
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOCUS
A. Right to Practice
The practice of law is not a right expressly guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, and admission to the bar of one state con-
fers no reciprocal constitutional right to practice in another. There
remain, nevertheless, constitutional limits on state authority to regu-
late practice. Schware v. Board of Examiners85 involved the refusal of
New Mexico to allow Schware to take its bar examination. The
United States Supreme Court held that the Board had acted arbitrarily
in deciding that Schware was deficient in moral character and that he
had been deprived of due process when he was denied an opportunity
to take the bar examination. The Board could require applicants to
meet its standards, "but any qualification must have a rational
connection with an applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." 86
84. A peculiar aspect of the introduction of privileges and immunities in Spanos
is that the defendant was a corporation. In Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168
(1868), and succeeding cases the Supreme Court has firmly established the principle
that "[a] corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the provision, and hence
has not 'privileges and immunities' secured to 'citizens' against state legislation." Orient
Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1899).
85. 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Compare Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65
Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966), noted in 55 CALIF. L. REV. 899
(1967), in which the court overruled the committee's decision that bar applicant
Hallinan lacked the requisite good moral character to become a lawyer because
he had been arrested for civil rights protests.
86. 353 U.S. at 239. A strong dictum is of interest: "A State cannot exclude a
person from the practice of law . . . in any manner or for reasons that contravene
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
238-39. Appended to this statement was the following footnote: "We need not enter
into a discussion whether the practice of law is a 'right' or 'privilege.' Regardless
of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is characterized.
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B. Right to Counsel
The right to counsel, including appointed counsel for indigents in
criminal cases where incarceration may occur, is an established consti-
tutional right.8 7 The right to court-appointed counsel has not been
recognized in civil cases, nor for misdemeanors or petty offenses when
no incarceration can be imposed, though such extension has been
strongly advocated.38 The implications of these constitutional devel-
opments for a "right" to out-of-state counsel are uncertain.
In U.S. v. Bergamo,89 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed a district court decision denying admission pro hac vice to a
foreign attorney to represent a criminal defendant. The court con-
cluded that the sixth amendment right to counsel as applied in federal
criminal proceedings includes counsel licensed by any state. Thus, the
court abandoned the admission regulation scheme in this criminal
case. A plausible explanation for the result in Bergamo is that the
place of bar membership was not really relevant because the trial was
in a federal court and primarily involved federal law. However, this
factor was not cited by the court. The result could also be justified if
admission pro hac vice had been wrongly or arbitrarily denied or if
local counsel had been unavailable, but the case did not turn on those
issues. 90
It would appear that Bergamo applies only to the federal court
system and does not affect the states' power to regulate foreign prac-
tice in criminal cases. This inference finds support in a later decision
in the same circuit, Cooper v. Hutchison,91 in which the court ex-
it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for
valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State's grace." Id. at
239 n.5.
87. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
88. See Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143
(1967).
89. 154F.2d31 (3dCir. 1946).
90. Bergamo involved a very confused fact situation which may have made articu-
lation of clear reasons difficult. Apparently the lower court judge had been virtually
"harassed" by foreign lawyers claiming to represent the defendants. He repeatedly
refused to admit them for the case on grounds that there were plenty of competent
local lawyers available. A final refusal to a foreign attorney was made the day
before the trial date. At trial, the local attorney who was to be associated on the case
refused to present the defense on the ground the unanticipated rejection of the chief
(foreign) counsel had left him unprepared. In short, it was clear that the client was
not adequately represented, but confusion over where the fault lay may have blurred
the issues and their resolution on appeal.
91. 184F.2d ll9(3dCir. 1950).
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pressed doubt that a defendant has a constitutional right to choose
any attorney. In addition, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York in People v. Epton,92 ruled some 20 years after Ber-
gamo, and 15 years after Cooper, that "counsel of his own choosing
means counsel recognized by the Courts of this State." In sum, the
Bergamo "right" to out-of-state counsel in federal criminal cases is
better viewed as a matter of federal judicial policy than as a constitu-
tional right.
The right to effective counsel, however, received constitutional
endorsement on first amendment grounds in NAACP v. Button.93 The
United States Supreme Court held in Button that states cannot regu-
late the practice of law in such a way as to preclude certain groups
from effective litigation. Recognizing civil rights litigation as "a form
of political expression, 94 the Court stated that the freedom of such
expression depends on the capacity to obtain effective counsel, in-
cluding out-of-state counsel when local representation is unavailable.
The Court also advanced the rule that when a client's constitutional
rights are involved, the burden of justifying admission restrictions
shifts to the state which then must "advance any substantial regulatory
interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from the practitioner's
activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions it has imposed. 95 In
two subsequent cases, 96 the Court found that state restrictions failed
to meet the "substantial regulatory interest" test announced in Button,
thus impermissibly violating the clients' right of freedom of associa-
tion. One of the cases, United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar As-
sociation, involved a union plan for referral and employment of attor-
neys to handle Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) claims. This
case is particularly relevant to the multistate practice issue because the
potential effect of the union plan would have been to channel cases to
out-of-state FELA expert attorneys.
The ramifications of these three Supreme Court decisions are not
entirely clear. One commentator suggests that they stand for an un-
qualified constitutional right to counsel of one's own choosing.97 This
92. 248 F. Supp. 276, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
93. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
94. Id. at 429.
95. Id. at 444.
96. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1 (1964); UMW, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
97. KATZ, supra note 8. at 4.
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interpretation would require invalidation of any regulation of multi-
state practice; a state would be required to grant "full faith and cred-
it" to the accreditation of an attorney of any other state, a notion
which no court has yet adopted. A narrower and more plausible
reading of the cases is that in some very special situations, such as the
civil rights context of the 1960's or the closely defined FELA scheme,
the interests of the client can take precedence over the state regulatory
interest to shift the burden of justifying the practice regulations to the
state.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Lefton v. City of
Hattiesburg,98 specifically established the right to foreign counsel in a
civil rights case and presented a difficult, but perhaps the most rational
rule. In Lefton, absence of local counsel was held to limit the state's
traditional discretion over admission pro hac vice: "[I) f no local
counsel are available, a court rule requiring local counsel should be
waived." 99 Although the solution is self-evident, the rule is rational
and addressed to the problem. The rule is also difficult to the extent
that "nonavailability" can be interpreted in a very subjective fashion
and is possibly onerous for clients to establish. How many members
of the local bar must have refused the case before nonavailability is
established? Still, these difficulties of practical application can be over-
come to make the rule work fairly for clients. Dealing with the essen-
tial and practical issue of availability of local counsel reaches the
heart of the multistate regulation problems and rationales and seems
far preferable to the process of trying to identify what is or is not
"constitutionally protected" by the first and sixth amendments.
VI. SPECIALIST ATTORNEYS IN OUT-OF-STATE
PRACTICE
The discussion thus far has pertained to attorneys generally, but a
cursory focus on several types of specialist attorneys--corporation
house counsel, civil rights attorneys and judge advocates--is useful to
illustrate the limits of existing regulatory schemes and the difficulties
in improving them.
98. 333 F.2d 280 (5thCir. 1964).
99. Id. at 285.
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A. Corporation House Counsel
Restrictive practice regulations are especially significant to attor-
neys employed by multistate business firms as house counsel. 100 In
some jurisdictions, the requirements for admission on motion for for-
eign house counsel are more stringent than for all other attorneys on
the grounds that house counsel, unlike private attorneys, do not gener-
ally practice law. 101 Corporate legal work is deemed too specialized to
100. Two surveys indicate that between 47 and 61% of all corporations employ
house counsel. A 1959 study relating the presence of a legal staff to the size of a


































Mathes & Clark, Organization for Legal Work, 16 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFER-
ENCE BOARD, BUSINESS RECORD 463 (1959). The 1959 survey was confirmed by a






















Forman & Brown, Board Chairmen, Presidents, Legal Counsel: Some Aspects of
Their Jobs, 4 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD
9, 11 (1967).
101. See Note, Corporate Counsel: Qualifications for Admission to the Bar on
Motion Under Reciprocity Statutes, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 235, 242 (1965).
The alternate position is that admission requirements for corporation house
counsel should be less stringent than those for privately-employed attorneys. It can
be argued that since corporate practice is a specialized activity often requiring inter-
state mobility, there should be special limited admission for foreign corporate prac-
titioners. The out-of-state admission would be automatic for those house counsel
duly licensed in any one state provided the practice is confined to office consultation
on corporate matters only. For example, the New Jersey State Bar Association has
recently granted associate membership to corporate counsel with an office in that














be considered as "practice of law" and counted toward the designated
number of years of practice required for admission on motion. 102 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court attempted to deal with the problem of
defining "practice of law" in Petitions of Jackson & Shields.10 3 The
Rhode Island State Board of Bar Examiners denied admission on mo-
tion to two attorneys, one a corporation attorney and member of the
New York bar and the other a navy judge advocate and member of
the District of Columbia bar, on the ground that they had not engaged
in "active general practice." The state supreme court reversed, stat-
ing:104
[T] he phrase 'general practice' does not contemplate . . . activities
ranging over the entire field of legal action. Such a view would ...
exclude from its purview lawyers who [are] specializing in some par-
ticular field of legal activity .... [T] he phrase 'general practice' was
intended to encompass all of the manifold activities of a legal nature
that inhere in the consequences of those human relationships of which
the law takes cognizance.
[A] lawyer who specializes in the adjustment of conflicts and
the termination of litigation generated by some particular human
relationship ... is engaged in the general practice of law ....
Other states have defined practice as restrictively as the Rhode Is-
land State Bar.105 Since in many corporate legal departments litigation
followed this lead. Letter from Brian D. Forrow, Vice President and General Coun-
sel, Allied Chemical Corp., to Samuel J. Brakel, June 10, 1974. ,The case for
special treatment of corporate counsel as distinct from any other specialist attorney
is of dubious validity. If corporate attorneys are entitled to such treatment, it may be
argued that other types of attorneys are equally entitled.
102. There are at least three problems with this argument. First, the argument is
not applied to local corporation house counsel who after years of exclusively cor-
porate practice presumably would encounter no problems in setting up as private
practitioners. Second, the unsatisfactory nature of the admission-on-motion scheme
itself which, if unaccompanied by requirements such as residence (liberally con-
strued) or special examination, is a poor method for assuring the competence of
any lawyer, corporate or otherwise. On the other hand, if the requirements of resi-
dence and/or examination are part of the admission scheme, and if the corporation
counsel meets them, then there remains no justification whatsoever for discriminatory
treatment. Finally, with the increase in specialization throughout law and society, and
the correlatively decreasing percentage of lawyers who "practice generally" as the ad-
mission on motion laws contemplate, it makes little sense to single out corporate
specialists as the one group failing to meet this criterion for admission.
103. 95 R.I. 393, 187 A.2d 536 (1963).
104. 187 A.2d at 539-40.
105. See Note, Corporate Counsel: Qualifications for Admission to the Bar on
Motion Under Reciprocity Statutes, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 235 (1965).
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is often referred to outside specialists, this provision imposes a special
hardship on corporate attorneys. The trial experience rule is a carry-
over from earlier times when a solo attorney practiced all phases of
law. 106
B. Civil Rights Attorneys
The problem regarding admission of foreign civil rights attorneys
can be framed in terms of "availability." Until recently (and perhaps
still today), it was difficult for some minority group members in cer-
tain localities to obtain local counsel for certain causes. These locali-
ties made foreign attorney admission rules more restrictive precisely in
response to the actions of foreign attorneys seeking to remedy the
availability problem.
The issue presents itself in two forms: foreign attorneys unable to
obtain admission pro hac vice because of inability to obtain local as-
sociated counsel, and foreign attorneys unable to obtain admission
despite local association. Both situations illustrate how statutes de-
signed to protect the public can become tools for depriving minority
groups of legal representation. The inability aspect was manifestly
present when local courts in the South during the 1960's convicted out-
of-state civil rights attorneys not associated with local counsel for
unauthorized practice. 107
Sobol v. Perez'0 8 and Sanders v. Russell'0 9 present the other facet
of the issue: denial of admission despite local association. In Sobol,
the foreign attorney, although associated with local counsel, was
charged with unauthorized practice. Sobol asked the federal district
court to enjoin his prosecution on the ground that Louisiana's un-
authorized practice statute violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment by depriving certain groups of needed represen-
tation. The court, while enjoining the prosecution, avoided the con-
stitutional issue and instead based its holding on a liberal reading of a
statutory exception. In doing so, the court focused squarely on the
availability issue-the unavailability of civil rights lawyers because of
106. See Hunt, What Constitutes Law Practice for Admission to the Bar on
Motion or by Comity? 29 BAR EXAM. 35, 38 (1960).
107. See Sherman, The Right to Representation by Out-of-State Attorneys in
Civil Rights Cases, 4 HARV. Cv. RIHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 65 (1968).
108. 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968).
109. 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968).
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harassment by authorities-which is the proper focus in multistate
practice regulation in this context.
In Sanders, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a Mississippi federal dis-
trict court ruling that (1) limited admission pro hac vice to attorneys
admitted elsewhere for five years or more and (2) restricted such ad-
missions to not more than one appearance per year.110 The circuit
court held, rather narrowly, that admission of the petitioning attor-
neys who did not meet these standards did not conflict with any legiti-
mate interests that may have motivated the district court to promul-
gate the rule."'
C. Judge Advocates
The problem for military judge advocates, 112 as for corporation
house counsel, is meeting the prior practice requirements for admis-
sion. The issue is whether military legal practice, like specialized
corporate practice, is within the scope of the statutory contemplation
of law practice.
In Application of Babcock,1 3 the Supreme Court of Alaska up-
held a state bar decision refusing admission to a former judge advo-
110. Id. at 243.
111. Id. at 245-46. Other indications that the circuit court intended its ruling to
be narrow are its avoidance of constitutional language and its provisos that the hold-
ing did not apply to practice in state courts, to fee-generating cases or general
admission in federal courts, or to admission pro hac vice without association with
local counsel. While avoidance of the constitutional issue was probably proper, the
other limitations on the holding are troublesome.
It is difficult to find justification for restricting admission pro hac vice to one ap-
pearance per year no matter what the forum. See notes 9 & 59 supra. The most ob-
vious ends served by such restriction are the illegitimate ones of obstructing civil
rights litigation and economic protectionism. Perhaps the court in limiting its holding
to the litigants and circumstances before it reasoned that a legitimate purpose was
conceivable. For example, limiting pro hac vice appearances to a small defined num-
ber can be said to be aimed at the foreign applicant who abuses the pro hac vice pro-
cedure when, given his or her intentions and circumstances, he or she should apply
for general admission.
As to the requirement of five years of practice, it is in itself not a sound requirement
upon which to base admission. Yet, because the statutory schemes of many states
contain similar requirements, see Part IlI-B supra, a broadside attack against the dis-
trict court rule seemed inappropriate. The conclusion that can be drawn from the
complexities raised by decisions such as Sanders is that rules and statutes which
clearly focus on the fundamental practice regulation goals--assuring the availability
of competent and ethical attorneys-would make abuses in the civil rights field more
difficult.
112. See Marks, supra note 56, for a recent evaluation of the Defense Depart-
ment's attempt to expand the military legal service program.
113. 387 P.2d 694 (Alas. 1963).
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cate who had served as a military lawyer for 10 years and had partici-
pated in over 1,000 trials:114
[W] e do not believe that it can be reasonably said of a lawyer in the
military service, even though he be assigned to do work only of a legal
nature, that he is engaged in the business or profession of practicing
law. His business or profession while in the Armed Forces, as we see
it, is that of being a soldier ....
This reasoning is not persuasive, and the Alaska Legislature has since
amended and enlarged the statutory definition of practice of law to
include military legal service. A few states, however, still expressly de-
cline to consider judge advocate service as legal work, and many other
jurisdictions in practice discourage admission of military applicants or
have no comity arrangements.' 15
In sum, the subject of admission of specialist attorneys is fraught
with issues which relate to matters of politics, economics and social
preconceptions, all of which are unrelated to the rationale of pro-
tecting the public from the incompetent and unethical conduct of for-
eign lawyers.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article has scrutinized the "hodgepodge of standards for ad-
mission" 116 as they relate to multistate practice. It has examined state
restrictions on various kinds of law practice by foreign attorneys, the
state interests and policies that undergird them and some of the judi-
cial limitations on these restrictions. On the basis of this study, several
specific recommendations are proposed.
The economic protection of the local bar cannot be recognized as a
114. Id.at697-98.
115. See Howell, Does Judge Advocate Service Qualify for Admission on Motion?
53 A.B.AJ. 915 (1967).
The difficulty with these statutes, the Alaska Supreme Court ruling and even the
Alaska legislation which eventually changed the law to include military practice with-
in the statutory definition, lies in their focus. The issue is framed in terms of whether
military practice is or should be considered "law practice"; however, the real issue is
whether a JAG member can be presumed to be sufficiently competent in local law
and procedures to be allowed to practice in that state. A judge advocate's practice
experience is as relevant for determining the narrow issue of local law competence as
the practice experience of any other foreign lawyer. In short, there is no reason to
treat the military lawyer any differently than any other foreign applicant; to do so is
an unjustifiable discrimination.
116. Chief Justice Warren Burger, quoted in Wilkey, Proposal for a "United States
Bar," 58 A.B.A.J. 355, 356 (1972).
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valid motive for restrictions on multistate practice; all rules whose
only justification is economic self-interest should be abolished. Pro
hac vice statutes need several modifications: (1) they should inquire
into the circumstances that make it necessary for the client to be rep-
resented by a foreign attorney and for the home state to abdicate its
usual controls; (2) those requirements based solely upon reciprocity
lack justification and should be abolished; (3) provisions requiring
association with local counsel are sound only so long as they are de-
signed to guarantee local competence in a field of law relative to the
case or instance for which admission pro hac vice is granted; (4) the
discretionary aspects of the pro hac vice scheme should be eliminated.
Labeling the practice of law a "privilege" as opposed to a "right" pro-
vides no justification for arbitrary or discriminatory admission pro hac
vice.
Permanent, in contrast to pro hac vice, admission should not be
based on reciprocity or comity principles alone, nor solely on a speci-
fied requisite period of foreign practice. Such provisions fail to assure
competence in local law and procedure; only among states with very
similar legal systems and customs is the application of these principles
appropriate. The statutes as presently constituted do not focus on that
circumstance. If reciprocity arrangements in multistate regulation are
to be retained, their focus should shift to the issue of similarity in laws
and procedures among reciprocating states.
Residence requirements are a conceptually appropriate way of
guaranteeing competence in local processes and ethical behavior. One
advantage of these provisions is that they give the potential client
population an opportunity to judge an attorney's qualifications. Un-
fortunately, as presently stated and applied, these requirements are
often too burdensome and should be relaxed. Compromise provisions
such as conditional licensing for a specified period appear preferable
to traditional residence rules. Thought might also be given to ex-
panding the requirement for local counsel association for a defined
period to permanent admission applicants; presently the requirement
is confined to pro hac vice applicants.
Moreover, permanent admission rules requiring trial experience are
unreasonable and should be abolished, since trial practice is only a
fraction of a lawyer's work and local applicants are not subjected to sim-
ilar requirements. Admission rules stipulating that the requisite period
of prior practice in the foreign state be in the state of original admis-
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sion are without justification and appear to exhibit only a prejudice
against mobility.
To the extent that admission regulations for either local or foreign
applicants are intended only to ensure competence in local laws and
procedures, requiring passage of a local bar examination so focused
appears reasonable. Special, limited examinations for foreign lawyer
applicants appear to be a logical and practical means for accom-
plishing the limited ends described. Discretionary examination, how-
ever, is a dubious principle. At best, it allows for relaxation of a bur-
densome requirement in cases where local law competence is assured
by other means, e.g., practice in a neighboring state with very similar
legal processes or perhaps even frequent pro hac vice practice in the
home state. The opportunity for favoritism or discrimination appears
to outweigh the advantages.
Proposals for a national bar examination and admission based ex-
clusively on such examination fail to acknowledge the state interest in
promoting competence in local law, procedure and custom. While the
pressures for liberalization of dated and narrow rules are real, further
fact gathering and reasoned analysis are necessary to enable the
striking of an appropriate balance between local needs and interests
and the demands of an increasingly mobile, complex and specialized
society. Multistate examination, as a supplement to, or supplemented
by, local examination is a more promising solution.
It seems appropriate for federal courts in their admission proce-
dures to consider state standards and requirements because state laws
and procedures are often applicable in federal courts. In addition,
federal court admission procedures would be improved by specifically
testing for federal law competence. Proposals for uniform federal bar
admission standards are sound so long as they retain the proviso that
local requirements be met as well.
Special agency-practice licensing of foreign attorneys or even lay-
persons, as is done by the U.S. Patent Office, seems acceptable. There
are methods, short of opposing such special licensing, to assure that
the licensees do not engage in the general "practice of law," however
defined.
That there will remain an area of foreign lawyer activity that is
very difficult, if not impossible, to regulate should perhaps be ac-
cepted as inevitable. It may be that it is not in a state's interest to en-
force, for example, prohibitions in every "isolated" instance of "office
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practice" by foreign lawyers. Nonenforcement in these areas is a "pro-
secutorial" decision; it is inappropriate for the courts to become in-
volved in such decisions and to fashion prosecutorial rules that have
no relationship to the basic purposes underlying multistate practice
regulations. Thus, courts should avoid rules turning on issues such as
whether the activity is "isolated," "supervisory," "incidental," "office"
or designated by any other labels that have little bearing on the goals
of assuring lawyer competence and ethical behavior. Similarly,
framing the multistate practice issues and decisions in federal constitu-
tional terms is unavailing and, more often than not, only diverts atten-
tion from more precise concerns.
Specialist lawyers, whether corporation, civil rights or military,
should not be subjected to more stringent rules than other attor-
neys when applying for foreign admission. Given the absence of valid
reasons for such differential treatment, it is essentially invidious dis-
crimination. On the other hand, further study is needed to make a
persuasive case for more lenient or limited admission standards for
specialist lawyers.
Finally, with respect to specialist and generalist attorneys alike,
empirical research is needed on the magnitude and nature of multi-
state practice. A two-part study would be desirable: (1) to assess the
extent of multistate practice by identifying those who have been or
can be expected to be affected by the regulations; 117 and (2) to ex-
amine the impact of multistate practice rules by relating them to the
actual experiences and work patterns of lawyers.11 8 Only then can the
117. The study should randomly sample lawyers, who would be asked a series of
short questions to determine the frequency, circumstances and reasons for which they
have desired, gained or been denied the opportunity to practice law in a foreignjurisdiction. Such questions would indirectly reveal a good deal about the nature of
law practice, the number and distribution of specialists and the level of specializa-
tion among "generalists." An ongoing study by Barlow F. Christensen of the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation entitled "The Work of Lawyers," involving intensive interviews
with selected samples of attorneys of one state, touches upon some of these issues.
The sample of lawyers surveyed would have to be large, but the questionnaire would
be simple and could perhaps be self-administered through the mails.
118. This part of the study would be more difficult and potentially more costly.
Lawyer and client mobility, the nature of clients and interstate legal problems, the
availability of experts or specialists, and the "litigation" versus "office practice" dis-
tinction are among the issues which should be examined. The method of study
for this part may have to be a choice among mutually exclusive alternatives. One
could either select one or a few of the many specialist lawyer groups or geographically
unique groups (such as lawyers practicing in bordertowns or cities) among whom the
incidence and seriousness of multistate practice problems--as revealed by the first part
of the study-is especially high. The procedure would be to study a sizable and
representative sample of these few groups in an effort to obtain an accurate picture
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propriety and enforceability of existing or proposed regulations be
fully assessed.
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of the problems relating to these selected groups. The alternative is to settle for a
much more flexible and impressionistic study of all the types and groups of lawyers
affected by multistate practice problems. One would forego a measure of accuracy
and in-depth knowledge in favor of a broader view of the impact of the regulations.
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